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The eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth has recently attracted a
signiﬁcant amount of attention. Financial liberalization, through giving
banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries more freedom of action, results
in resources being governed by the market mechanism and hence being
more eﬃciently allocated. Three broad types of ﬁnancial liberalization are
discussed. One is concerned with lifting the restrictions on the domestic ﬁ-
nancial sector, which includes the deregulation of the interest rate, the
exchange rate, allowing new ﬁnancial instruments to be introduced, and
encouraging mergers among ﬁnancial institutions, to name but a few.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) have chosen the deregulation of
bank interest rates as the centerpiece of ﬁnancial liberalization. Montes-
Negret and Landa (2001) study the Mexican ﬁnancial process.
The second broad liberalization concerns the opening up of the domes-
tic market to international participants, that is, allowing the domestic mar-
ket to be parallel to the international one. Claessens and Glaessner (1998)
point out that internationalization has helped build more robust and eﬃ-
cient ﬁnancial systems by introducing international practices and stan-
dards, by allowing more stable sources of funds, and by improving the
quality, eﬃciency, and breadth of ﬁnancial services. Claessens, Demirgüç-
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June 22–24, 2006.Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) study the eﬀects of foreign bank entry on the
eﬃciency of domestic banks. The experiences of various countries seem to
suggest that a foreign bank presence can facilitate increased competition,
improve the allocation of credit, and help increase access to international
capital markets. Henry (2000) and Beakers and Harvey (2000) show that
the liberalization of equity markets, through a reduction in the cost of cap-
ital, leads to an increase in real economic growth on an annual basis.
The third approach is to construct a ﬁnancial liberalization index on the
basis of the World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. The mem-
bers of the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), the predeces-
sor of the WTO,1commenced bilateral negotiations on services in 1994 and
have started to submit liberalization commitments and schedules since
then. Each member, in considering its own domestic situation, has pro-
gressively liberalized its trade in services according to these schedules.
There are twelve sectors covered in the services negotiation under the
WTO; we focus particularly on the largest one, the ﬁnancial services sec-
tor. For each subsector of ﬁnancial services, each country promises three
types of commitment: unbound (no commitment), bound (partial commit-
ment), and none (full commitment). By employing the commitments data
as of mid-1994, Hoekman (1995, 1996) uses values of 0, 0.5, and 1 to enu-
merate the above three kinds of commitments, with a higher number de-
noting a higher degree of liberalization. They use this frequency measures
method to quantify the impediments to trade and investment in services,
which are less transparent and more diﬃcult to quantify.
The ﬁrst purpose of this chapter is to extend and improve the method
suggested by Hoekman (1995, 1996) in calculating the ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion indices. However, we make several revisions. The ﬁrst revision is con-
cerned with covering the services supply mode2 that deals with the move-
ment/presence of natural persons and all sub-sectors listed in the Annex on
Financial Services. The second revision is to employ weighting on four
modes of services supply. The last revision, instead of unanimously giving
a 0.5 score to the partial commitments as Hoekman (1995, 1996) and
Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) did, is intended to analyze in more de-
tail the information involved within diﬀerent degrees of liberalization and
thus score further on the partial commitments.
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1. The WTO began life on January 1, 1995, but its trading system is half a century older.
Since 1948, the GATT has provided the rules for the system. The last and largest GATT round
was the Uruguay Round, which lasted from 1986 to 1994 and led to the WTO’s creation.
Whereas the GATT dealt mainly with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements now cover
trade in services, in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and
other areas.
2. The GATS distinguishes the ways in which services are supplied into four possible
modes, which are listed as cross-border supply (Mode 1), consumption abroad (Mode 2),
commercial presence (Mode 3), and the presence of natural persons (Mode 4). Section 10.2
of this chapter will further explain these modes.The second purpose of this chapter is to study the eﬀect of liberalization
on economic growth. By employing our newly-constructed ﬁnancial index,
we investigate the eﬀects of liberalization on economic growth. In the lit-
erature, the diﬀerent spheres of liberalization are threefold, namely, trade,
ﬁnancial, and equity liberalization. For studies using the trade liberaliza-
tion as the proxy for liberalization, Francois and Schuknecht (1999), who
employ the openness in trade, ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between
growth and competition within the ﬁnancial sector. Eschenbach, Francois,
and Schuknecht (2000) also place emphasis on the procompetitive eﬀects
of trade in ﬁnancial services. Since ﬁnancial services are the nexus of the
savings and accumulation mechanism that drives economic growth, they
consider it appropriate to emphasize trade in services and growth. By
working with a cross-country sample of ninety-three countries, Tornell,
Westerman, and Martinez (2004) have recently found that trade liberaliza-
tion enhances growth but that ﬁnancial liberalization does not necessarily
lead to more rapid growth, in large part because it is associated with risky
capital ﬂows, lending booms, and crises. With regard to ﬁnancial liberal-
ization, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) ﬁnd that ﬁnancial liberal-
ization has a very large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probabil-
ity of a banking crisis. Shen and Lee (2006), in using the liberalization dates
suggested by Kaminsky and Reinhert (2002), ﬁnd that the liberalization
has little eﬀect on the relationship between ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic growth. Finally, for studies using equity liberalization, Henry (2000)
reports that equity liberalization has preceded private investment booms in
nine of eleven developed countries. Although they discuss a slightly diﬀer-
ent issue, Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) reject the hypothesis that market
liberalization aﬀects the economy. There is no research that uses the WTO
liberalization index to study the same issue.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 in-
troduces the history of WTO commitments and describes how we con-
struct the ﬁnancial liberalization index. Section 10.3 discusses some inter-
esting patterns of the ﬁnancial liberalization under the WTO. Section 10.4
describes the empirical models and data, while section 10.5 presents the
empirical ﬁndings. Finally, section 10.6 summarizes the conclusions that
are drawn.
10.2 WTO Commitments and the Liberalization 
Index for Financial Services
10.2.1 Introduction to WTO Commitments for Financial Services
The construction of a ﬁnancial liberalization index in our chapter is
based on the negotiation results within the WTO. The WTO requests that
member countries negotiate with each other on the liberalization of trade
Financial Liberalization under the WTO and the Macro Economy 317in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property rights.3
This chapter deals only with the second category, that is, trade in services.
There are twelve sectors that are included in these services and we particu-
larly focus on the ﬁnancial services sector, which is the largest service sec-
tor in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Furthermore, this service sector can be categorized into two major sub-
sectors, one being the banking and other ﬁnancial servicessubsector and the
other the insurance and insurance-related servicessubsector. In our chapter,
the negotiation results within the WTO for both subsectors are taken into
account when the ﬁnancial liberalization index is constructed.
The GATS negotiations on trade in services have so far gone through
two stages. The ﬁrst stage started in 1994 and continued until 2000,
whereas the second started in 2001 and extended through 2006. During the
ﬁrst period, the critical part of the GATS negotiations that was referred to
as “speciﬁc commitments” in regard to the liberalization schedules, was
submitted by the WTO members beginning in 1994.
After that, the ﬁrst round of negotiations on ﬁnancial services in the con-
text of the GATS was concluded in December 1997 and became fully sub-
ject to multilateral trade rules. Some members, nevertheless, did not pro-
vide their liberalization schedules until 2000 for the sake of their domestic
situation. Not only did the agreement consolidate the relatively open poli-
cies of industrial countries that account for much of the world trade in ﬁ-
nancial services, but it also evoked wide participation from both develop-
ing countries and countries in transition. The wide coverage of the WTO
members is the reason why, in this chapter, we build the ﬁnancial liberal-
ization index based on the GATS commitments.
The next round of negotiations to further liberalize trade in services
started March 28, 2001, when the WTO Council for Trade in Services
adopted the Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations as the basis for
continuing the negotiations. Participants were to submit requests and oﬀers
for speciﬁc commitments by certain deadlines. However, as the request and
oﬀer negotiations continued among WTO members, the contents of the
speciﬁc commitments also continued to be updated until 2006. As a result,
our data for ﬁnancial liberalization and the coordinating macroeconomic
data are classiﬁed into the two periods, as previously shown.
The GATS also distinguishes ways of categorizing supply into four pos-
sible modes, which are listed as cross-border supply (mode 1),4 consump-
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3. These three parts are stipulated under the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade
(GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and Trade Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), respectively.
4. Under the mode for cross-border supply, the services suppliers and consumers remain in
their own domestic territories, while tackling the trading business between them via the In-
ternet or through the use of other electronic tools, such as facsimiles.tion abroad (mode 2),5 commercial presence (mode 3),6 and the movement
of natural persons (mode 4). One example of ﬁnancial services in mode 1
is buying overseas mutual funds via the Internet. Buying insurance in a for-
eign country when a person travels abroad is an example of mode 2. As for
mode 3, the worldwide Citi-Group branch establishments would be a typ-
ical case. Sending intracorporate transferees to one speciﬁc branch is a
mode 4. Basically, modes 1, 2, and 4 are all diﬀerent forms of cross-border
trade, whereas mode 3 generally involves investment (foreign direct invest-
ment) in the service-importing economy.
It is interesting to explore, at least to some degree, how the GATS com-
mitments relate to actual liberalization measures in the real world. The ex-
tent of the new liberalization eﬀected by GATS commitments on ﬁnancial
services is somewhat limited, with many members binding either at the
level of their existing practices or at a level lower than their existing prac-
tices (PECC International Secretariat 2003). In the latter cases, GATS
commitments (the de jure indication) were a misleading indicator of the ex-
tent to which liberalization had actually taken place (the de facto indica-
tors). There are reasons for WTO members choosing to have this kind of
situation. The WTO commitment schedule is legally binding for all mem-
bers. Strict dispute settlement procedures will be initiated by members
whenever their beneﬁts are impeded once the commitment schedule is not
followed by a certain member or members. To avoid the legal constraints
mentioned above, some members would end up having their GATS com-
mitments no more favorable than the real regulation.
Besides, recognizing the beneﬁts of liberalizing trade in services has en-
couraged a number of economies, including some in the APEC region such
as Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, to undertake unilateral liberalization in
this sector. Subsequent unilateral liberalization by some members has
widened the gap between GATS commitments and actual measures. The
credit for such autonomous liberalization is currently an important nego-
tiating issue for those economies that have engaged in it (PECC Interna-
tional Secretariat 2003).
10.2.2 Construction of the Financial Liberalization Index
Our liberalization index is constructed by using the commitments of the
four modes within various subsectors of ﬁnancial services. As mentioned
in the Introduction, three types of commitments, unbound (no commit-
ment),  bound (partial commitment), and none (full commitment), are
promised by each country. Because the impediments to trade and invest-
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5. Consumption abroad keeps services suppliers in their own domestic territory, while con-
sumers move into the territory of the services suppliers and proceed to trade there.
6. Commercial presence keeps services consumers in their own domestic territory, while
suppliers move into the territory of the consumers and proceed to trade there.ment in services tend to be in the form of nontariﬀ barriers (NTBs), which
are less transparent and diﬃcult to quantify, researchers often adopt the
frequency measures method.7 PECC (1995), Hoekman (1995, 1996), and
Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) are among the seminal studies to em-
ploy the frequency measures methodology to compile indices of services to
measure the degree of restrictiveness or liberalization of trade in services.
McGuire and Schuele (2000) also propose a restrictiveness index8for bank-
ing services and compile a list of nonprudential regulations on entry and
operations for banking services from various sources. These sources in-
clude the GATS commitments, the information from APEC Individual
Action Plans, WTO Trade Policy Reviews, and information provided by
several countries to the IMF as a requirement for receiving standby credit
facilities. Mattoo (1998, 2000) constructs commitment indices for the Sec-
ond Protocol using a speciﬁc weighting scheme, considering the impor-
tance of modes (based on U.S. data) for 105 countries’ market access com-
mitments in banking (deposits and lending) and direct insurance (life and
nonlife). Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian (2006) present a ﬁnancial
index of openness to quantify the nature and extent of restrictions on in-
ternational trade in ﬁnancial services.
The estimates of the measures for the liberalization of services trade in
the previous literature, however, contain several shortcomings. Our chap-
ter revises the previously produced ﬁnancial liberalization index in three
respects. First, we cover mode 4 and all subsectors listed in the “Annex on
Financial Services” of the GATS. Then we assign weights for the four
modes. Finally, and most importantly, we score partial commitments,
which are ignored in earlier works. These three major types of revisions are
accounted for below.
First, our liberalization index covers mode 4, which is the movement of
natural persons. Except for Hoekman (1995, 1996), McGuire and Schuele
(2000), and Claessens and Glaessner (1998), who cover only some parts of
mode 4, past studies typically do not take this mode into account.9The cri-
teria for scoring the liberalization index and the categories for mode 4 are
listed in table 10.1, where higher scores denote higher degrees of liberal-
ization. The two extreme cases, “unbound” (no commitment) and “none”
(full commitment), are assigned scores of 0 and 1, respectively. Partial
commitments are here assigned scores from 0.25 to 0.75, depending on the
respective degrees of openness as described in table 10.1.
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7. This is also referred to as index methodology.
8. McGuire and Schuele (2000) use higher scores to denote higher degrees of restriction,
whereas we use higher scores to denote higher degrees of liberalization. In other words, the
restrictiveness index produced in McGuire and Schuele (2000) is similar to our liberalization
index in terms of the concept, yet opposite in terms of the content’s meaning.
9. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001), Mattoo (1998, 2000), and Mattoo,
Rathindran, and Subramanian (2006) do not take mode 4 into account.This chapter also takes into account all of the subsectors covered in the
context of the GATS.10 By contrast, Claessens and Glaessner (1998), Mat-
too (1998, 2000), and McGuire and Schuele (2000)11 do not cover the sub-
sectors as completely as we do here.
The second revision concerns the weighting of the four modes. Most
countries do not provide a precise identiﬁcation of the patterns of trade
based on diﬀerent modes,12 except the United States. Therefore, previous
studies often use a simple-weighted average. By considering that commit-
ments with heavier amounts trade should be assigned more weight, we
therefore follow Mattoo’s (1998, 2000) method to adopt the data from the
United States Financial Services Trade by Mode of Supply, 1994. Mattoo
(1998, 2000), however, does not include mode 4 and covers only parts of the
subsectors.13 We therefore make some revisions to his approach and pre-
sent the ﬁnal weight in table 10.2. After our revisions, the trade that takes
place as a result of the commercial presence in the insurance subsector is
about four times that generated through across-border trade. In banking
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10. These subsectors are listed in the Annex on Financial Services of the GATS.
11. For instance, McGuire and Schuele (2000) cover only the banking subsector.
12. Maurer (2005) reported the weights for the four modes as 0.35, 0.12–0.15, 0.5, and
0.01–0.02, respectively. However, these ﬁgures are derived on an aggregated level and cover all
of the service sectors.
13. Mattoo (1998, 2000) covers only life and nonlife insurance in the insurance subsector,
and deposits and lending in the banking subsector, as shown in table 10.2.
Table 10.1 Scoring liberalization index for M4
The Criteria Score
Unbound 0
(1) Only referring to general requirements for entry, including the economic need 
test (ENT) or making reference to laws and regulations 0.25
(2) Conditionally allowing the entry of 1~2 kinds of the above-mentioned natural 
persons
(1) Unconditionally allowing the entry of 2 kinds of the above-mentioned natural 
persons 0.5
(2) Conditionally allowing the entry of 3~4 kinds of the above-mentioned natural 
persons
Unconditionally allowing the entry of 4 kinds of the above-mentioned natural persons 0.75
None 1
Note: This paper computes these scores based on the classiﬁcation summarized in the WTO
document (JOB[03]/195), which describes frequently-used categories of natural persons in-
cluded under mode 4 in the horizontal section of members’ schedules of speciﬁc commit-
ments. The four main categories are intracorporate transferees (ICT), business visitors (BV)
and service salespersons (SS), contractual service suppliers (CSS) and other categories. CSS
includes employees of juridical persons and independent professionals. Other categories con-
tain graduate trainees and spouses and partners of ICT.and securities services, the trade arising through the commercial presence
is two and a half times that achieved through the cross-border trade.
Finally, partial commitments are scored. Due to the diﬃculty in judging
how the presence of speciﬁc restrictions is to be evaluated, Hoekman
(1995, 1996) assigned a score of 0.5 for each partial commitment. Al-
though this method has its merits in that it is simple and straightforward,
the information resulting from diﬀerent degrees of liberalization has been
lost. Mattoo (1998, 2000) adopts a slightly more sophisticated approach,
but only handles the commitments in relation to mode 3. Qian (2000) and
Valckx (2002) also adopt the same method. Furthermore, Valckx (2002)
believes that the unbound feature is slightly better than a blank entry, and
hence the score 0.05 is given instead of 0. Valckx (2002) also gives licensing
subject to requirements a slightly higher score than discretionary licensing,
in order to make a distinction between the two limitations. This chapter
employs the formula proposed by Switzerland (TN/S/W/51, September
2005) to deal with this issue more delicately.
Our methodology of scoring partial commitments deserves description.
As suggested by Switzerland, each member’s speciﬁc commitments are 
entered according to an arithmetic formula (continuous function) referred
to as the formula Cn, where C denotes any coeﬃcient between 0 and 1, and
superscript n denotes the number of scheduled restrictions in one entry.
For practical purposes, the coeﬃcient C is set at 0.5, although it could be
any number given that it equally applies to all schedules.14 The formula is
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Table 10.2 Comparison of weights among four modes in the ﬁnancial sector
All Insurance and 
Insurance-Related Services Banking and Other Financial Services
Mattoo (1998, 2000) Mattoo (1998, 2000)
Life Non-life Weights adopted Deposits  Lending Weights adopted
Mode Services Services by the authors Services Services by the authors
Mode 1 0.12 0.20 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.24
Mode 2 0.03 0.05 0.045 0.03 0.05 0.06
Mode 3 0.85 0.75 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.6
Mode 4 — — 0.025 — — 0.1
Note: According to Article I of the GATS, the four modes of the supply of a service are deﬁned as: 
Mode 1 (cross-border supply)—the supply of a service from the territory of one member into the territory
of any other member; Mode 2 (consumption abroad)—the supply of a service in the territory of one mem-
ber to the service consumer of any other member; Mode 3 (commercial presence)—the supply of a service
by a service supplier of one member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other member;
Mode 4 (the movement/presence of natural persons)—the supply of a service by a service supplier of one
member, through the presence of natural persons of a member in the territory of any other member.
14. The value of the coeﬃcient is not of particular relevance since comparability across
commitments and members lies at the heart of the exercise.based on two considerations. First, each limitation to market access and/or
national treatment is an additional burden for the service supplier (or con-
sumer). Therefore, an accurate and reliable methodology has to allow bar-
riers to trade for every scheduled limitation to be tracked. Second, it is as-
sumed that the marginal burden that falls on the service supplier due to an
additional limitation is decreasing.
For simplicity, this chapter counts the number of scheduled restrictions
aﬀecting market access and national treatment according to the classiﬁca-
tion speciﬁed in Bosworth et al. (2000). Besides the classiﬁcation speciﬁed
in Article XVI of the GATS,15 Bosworth et al. (2000) add one more mea-
sure aﬀecting market access, “other” to avoid missing any other kinds of
restrictions.
10.3 Interesting Patterns of the Financial Liberalization under the WTO
After the construction of the ﬁnancial liberalization index based on
GATS commitments, we highlight seven important patterns.
First, as can be seen in table 10.3, the degree of liberalization of ﬁnancial
services over the 2001–2006 period is overall higher than that during the
1994–2000 period. The low income countries and high income non-OECD
countries have improved the most among the ﬁve income level groups. High
income non-OECD countries are observed to have improved a great deal,
especially in the subsector for insurance and insurance-related services.
Second, a member with a high degree of liberalization in one of these two
subsectors in ﬁnancial services tends to have a high degree of liberalization
in the other subsector. This is because the correlation of the liberalization
indices between the insurance industry and the banking-and-others indus-
try is 70.04 percent during the period 1994–2000, and is also 71.03 percent
during 2001–2006.
Third, under modes 1, 2 and 3, the degree of liberalization in relation to
market access is positively correlated with the income level; however, there
is no such link under mode 4. This is probably because mode 4 is related to
the natural persons and because developing countries have abundant labor
resources; thus, developing countries promote liberalization under mode 4
the most. By contrast, developed countries are modest in terms of liberal-
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15. The classiﬁcation of the scheduled restrictions speciﬁed in Bosworth, Findlay, Trewin,
and Warren (2000) is as follows: (a) measures aﬀecting market access include limitations on
the number of service suppliers, limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets,
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service out-
puts, limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a sector,
measures which restrict or require speciﬁc types of legal entity or joint venture, limitations on
the participation of foreign capital, and other measures aﬀecting market access; (b) measures
aﬀecting national treatment include discriminatory taxes, discriminatory incentives/subsi-
dies, government procurement policies, local content requirements, nationality, citizenship
or residence requirements, and other measures aﬀecting national treatment.izing under mode 4 and focus more on the issues of improving trans-
parency and procedures related to the movement of natural persons.
Fourth, we compare the performance of liberalization across the four
modes. Higher income members16 have, on average, the highest level of
market access liberalization under mode 2. Considering the diﬃculty in-
volved in regulating consumption abroad, many WTO members therefore
choose to liberalize the market access under mode 2. However, with regard
to the national treatment part, mode 3 appears to have the highest degree
of liberalization regardless of the income level.
Furthermore, it is found in table 10.4,in which countries are classiﬁed by
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Table 10.3 Comparison of the liberalization index of ﬁnancial services in the two periods of
1994–2000 and 2001–2006 classiﬁed by income level
All Insurance Banking  
Time and and  Other All
No. of Period/% Insurance-related  Financial Financial
Income Level Countries of Change Services Services Services
High income  24 1994–2000 0.6904 0.7173 0.7038
OECD countries 2001–2006 0.7584 0.7763 0.7674
% of change 9.85 8.23 9.04
High income   13 1994–2000 0.4821 0.432 0.4571
Non-OECD 2001–2006 0.6364 0.4708 0.5536
countries % of change 32.01 8.98 21.11
Upper-middle 25 1994–2000 0.4947 0.4569 0.4758
income countries 2001–2006 0.5625 0.4577 0.5101
% of change 13.71 0.18 7.21
Low-middle 27 1994–2000 0.4428 0.3625 0.4027
income countries 2001–2006 0.4708 0.3761 0.4235
% of change 6.32 3.75 5.17
Low income  4 1994–2000 0.2658 0.233 0.2494
countries 2001–2006 0.3319 0.2852 0.3086
% of change 24.87 22.40 23.74
Notes:High income OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
High income non-OECD countries include Bahrain, Brunei, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, Liechten-
stein, Macao, Malta, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Taiwan, and United Arab Emirates. Upper-middle
income countries include Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Dominica, Estonia, Gabon, Grenada, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Panama, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Oman. Low-middle income countries include Alba-
nia, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Macedonia, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Tunisia, and Turkey. Low income countries include
India, Kenya, Nicaragua, and Pakistan. Weights among the four modes are the same as those adopted
by the authors in 10.2.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.geographic region, that East Asia and the Paciﬁc, and Latin America and
the Caribbean liberalize mode 3 the most in the insurance and insurance-
related services subsector. On the other hand, Europe and Central Asia,
the Middle East and North Africa, and North American countries choose
to liberalize less under mode 3 compared to modes 1 and 2. The degree of
liberalization in the banking and other ﬁnancial services subsector under
mode 3 for East Asia and the Paciﬁc region, though not the highest, still re-
mains high among the four modes, as shown in table 10.5. East Asia and
the Paciﬁc, and Latin American and the Caribbean regions comprise many
developing countries, which attract experienced foreign ﬁnancial institu-
tions through foreign direct investment (i.e., mode 3) that in a great way
help develop their own domestic ﬁnancial industries. Due to the liberaliza-
tion in relation to mode 3, and by attracting much incoming foreign direct
investment, these countries not only enhance industrial development and
technology transfer, but also raise their domestic employment in these ar-
eas. Mode 3, as a result, is traditionally the most popular liberalization
mode for the governments in these regions.
Under the WTO, commitments to liberalize mode 1 of a service oblige a
member to allow the necessary capital movements. To reduce the chances 
of the occurrence of a ﬁnancial crisis facilitated by capital movements,
many WTO members therefore choose to liberalize mode 1 as little as pos-
sible. Compared with other regions, European and Central Asian and North
American (except for the insurance subsector) countries have a higher de-
gree of liberalization in regard to mode 1, as shown in table 10.4 and table
10.5. Does this have anything to do with their performance in the trade in
ﬁnancial services or with the occurrence of ﬁnancial crises? The next two
patterns would be a good, yet preliminary, kickoﬀ for examining this issue.
From table 10.4 and table 10.5, we ﬁnd that some regions have similar lib-
eralization performances across diﬀerent subsectors, but that some regions
do not. In the former cases, East Asia and the Paciﬁc region ranks fourth
and Europe and the Central Asia region ranks ﬁrst in both subsectors. By
contrast, the ﬁnancial liberalization in North America and the Sub-
Saharan African regions is very diﬀerent in the diﬀerent subsectors. For in-
stance, North America is the second most liberal region in regards to the
banking and other ﬁnancial services subsector, whereas it only ranks as the
ﬁfth most liberal region in relation to the insurance and insurance-related
services subsector. The degree of liberalization in North America in the lat-
ter subsector surprisingly lags behind many other less developed regions,
such as East Asia and Paciﬁc and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions.
Finally, we examine the correlation between the ﬁnancial liberalization
index and the trade balance (i.e., the current account) of ﬁnancial services
for ninety-three WTO members. It is found in table 10.6 that, regardless of
the subsectors, the liberalization index has a higher degree of correlation
with the total trade balance (i.e., exports plus imports) than the net trade

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.balance (i.e., exports minus imports). The net trade balance, theoretically
speaking, should be more closely connected with each member’s exchange
rate and competitiveness in their respective areas. The existing current ac-
count statistics for services from the IMF, however, do not cover the trad-
ing volume deﬁned by mode 3 and mode 4. It is therefore more reasonable
to consider only the degree of liberalization for mode 1 and mode 2 when
examining this issue. The liberalization index that is composed of only
mode 1 and mode 2 (with 0.8 and 0.2 weights, respectively) is further es-
tablished to explore the above relationship. As shown in the last column of
table 10.6, the correlation between the liberalization index and both trade
balances, respectively, is raised when only mode 1 and mode 2 are covered.
Again, the liberalization index for overall ﬁnancial services has a higher
degree of correlation with the total trade balance than with the net trade
balance.
10.4 Econometric Model
This section speciﬁes the relationship between ﬁnancial liberalization
and macroeconomic performance, which is measured in terms of the aver-
age growth rate for per capita GDP for the periods 1994–2000 and
2001–2006, respectively. By employing a similar model to that in Eschen-
bach, Francois, and Schuknecht (2000), our model is,
Model (A):
(1) PCGDPGRI   a0 a1COMMITTOBANKi
 a2CONCENTRATIONi a3CREDITi a4TRADEi
 a5STDINFLAi a6PCGDP90i
 a7SECOND90 i a8INSTITUTIONi
 a9POPGR εi
(2) CONCENTRATIONj b0 b1COMMITTOBANKj b2SIZEj εj
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Table 10.6 The relationship (correlation coefﬁcient) between the ﬁnancial liberalization 
index and the trade balance (current account) of ﬁnancial services for 
WTO members
Weights adopted 
Sub-sectors Trade Balance by the authors 0.8 * M1 + 0. 2 * M2
Insurance services Net Trade Balance 0.102965 0.276626
Total Trade Balance 0.137906 0.150024
Banking and other services Net Trade Balance 0.094380 0.179390
Total Trade Balance 0.306151 0.377653
Financial services Net Trade Balance 0.154236 0.294957
Total Trade Balance 0.270827 0.328254Model (B):
(1) PCGDPGRi  a0 a1CONCENTRATIONi a2CREDITi
 a3TRADEi a4STDINFLAi a5PCGDP90i
 a6SECOND90i a7INSTITUTIONi
 a8POPGRi εi
(2) CONCENTRATIONj b0 b1COMMITTOBANKj b2SIZEj εj
Model (C):
(1) PCGDPGRi a0 a1COMMITTOALLi a2COMMITTOALLi
2
 a3CONCENTRATIONi a4CREDITi
 a5TRADEi a6STDINFLAi a7PCGDP90i
 a8SECOND90i a9INSTITUTIONi εi
Model (D): 
(1) PCGDPGRi  a0   a1COMMITTOBANKj
  a2CONCENTRATIONi   a3CREDITi
  a4TRADEi   a2STDINFLA i   a6PCGDP90i
  a7SECOND90i   a8INSTITUTIONi   a9POPGRi
  a10INVESTMENTi   εi
(2) CONCENTRATIONj   b0   b1COMMITTOBANKj   b2SIZEi   εj
(3) a1  c0   c1GOVERNANCE   c2REGION;
where  COMMITTOBANK is the constructed liberalization index de-
scribed in the previous section; CONCENTRATION is the concentration
ratio of the banking sector, which is the sum of the market shares (mea-
sured in total assets) of the three largest banks in a country; CREDITis the
private credit to total credit; TRADE depicts the trade openness, which is
the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP; STDINFLA is the stan-
dard deviation of the inﬂation rate; PCGDP90 is the per capita GDP in
1990, which is the proxy for the initial endowment; SECOND90 denotes
the primary school enrollment and secondary school enrollment ratio in
1990; SIZE is included because, as discussed in Francois and Schuknecht
(1999), larger markets can imply more scope for competition, particularly
if scale economies are present.
There are two vectors of conditional variables in Model (D). The ﬁrst
vector of variables is GOVERNANCE, which contains ﬁve government
governance variables. The ﬁrst one is GOVEFFECT, which denotes gov-
ernment eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality taken from Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005, hereafter KKZ). Next, SUPERVISION,
which denotes the oﬃcial supervisory power, examines whether the super-
visory authorities possess the power to take corrective action when con-
fronted with violations of regulations or other imprudent behavior on the
Financial Liberalization under the WTO and the Macro Economy 329part of banks. The larger the number, the more the authority has the power
to supervise the banks. The variable is taken from Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2006). Third, PRIVATEMONITOR denotes the private monitor-
ing index, which is also taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). It
means that bank behavior is aﬀected by private market forces and the
greater the ﬁgure, the more the public has access to information regarding
the overall condition of the banking industry. Fourth, CAPITALREGU,
which is the capital regulatory index and is taken from Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2006), examines whether there are explicit regulatory requirements
regarding the amount of capital. Last, INSTITUTION denotes the cor-
ruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality, which is taken from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
The second set REGION includes three regional dummies, which are
EASIA, denoting the dummy variable for the East Asian and Paciﬁc coun-
tries; LATIN, denoting the dummy variable for the Latin American and
Caribbean countries; and SAHARAN, denoting the dummy variable for
the Sub-Saharan African countries. Detailed deﬁnitions and sources of
these and other variables are reported in table 10.7.
The four models can be accounted for as follows. Model (A) investigates
the direct and indirect links between banking liberalization and economic
growth. If there is a direct impact, COMMITTOBANKin equation (1) will
have a positive eﬀect on growth and a1 is signiﬁcant. If there is an indirect
impact, COMMITTOBANK should have a negative eﬀect on CONCEN-
TRATION, which also has a negative eﬀect on growth. This suggests that
a2 and b1 are negative.
Model (B) is similar to Model (A) but does not consider the direct eﬀect
by taking COMMITTOBANK out of equation (1). Thus, only the indirect
link between banking liberalization and economic growth is examined,
whereas the eﬀects related to trade in ﬁnancial services are then subsumed
into the CONCENTRATION term.
Model (C) is opposite to Model (B) in that it only explores the direct re-
lationship between the total ﬁnancial liberalization and economic growth.
Thus, the variable COMMITTOALL appears in equation (1), and equa-
tion (2) is removed. The concept can also be found in Mattoo, Rathindran,
and Subramanian (2006), where the term COMMITTOBANK is replaced
by the term COMMITTOALL to take into account the impact of liberal-
ization of the ﬁnancial subsectors overall.
In contrast to the above three models, where the impact of COMMIT-
TOBANK is constant, Model (D) permits the direct impacts to be inﬂu-
enced by the two sets of variables, GOVERNANCEand REGION. As sug-
gested by Shen and Lee (2006), good governance should strengthen the
impact of liberalization. We do not have priors regarding the impacts of the
regional eﬀects.
The control variables in the four models are similar to those reported in
330 Lee-Rong Wang, Chung-Hua Shen, and Ching-Yang LiangTable 10.7 Mnemonics and description and sources of variables
Variable Name Description Source
PCGDPGR The average of the per capita growth rate over the respective  WDI and IFS
1994–2000 and 2001–2006 periods
COMMITTOBANK Score on the index of ﬁnancial liberalization calculated from  Constructed 
each WTO member’s GATS commitments in ﬁnancial  by authors
services (excluding insurance).
COMMITTOALL Score on the index of ﬁnancial liberalization calculated from  Constructed 
each WTO member’s GATS commitments in ﬁnancial  by authors
services (including insurance).
CONCENTRATION Concentration in the ﬁnancial sector: the assets of the 3 largest  BDL
banks as a share of total assets expressed as a percentage,  
averaged over 1994–2000 and 2001–2006, respectively.
CREDIT Credit to the private sector as a percentage of total credit,  WDI and IFS
averaged over the periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2006, 
respectively.
TRADE Trade openness, exports plus imports over GDP, averaged  WDI and IFS
over the periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2006, respectively.
STDINFLA The standard deviation of the inﬂation rate over the  WDI and IFS
respective 1994–2000 and 2001–2006 periods.
PCGDP90 Per capita GDP in 1990. WDI and IFS
SECOND90 The primary school enrollment and secondary school  WDI
enrollment ratio in 1990.
INSTITUTION General conditions of corruption, law and order, and  ICRG
bureaucratic quality (from Political Risk Services), ranging 
from 0 to 6, where 6 is the best, averaged over the periods 
1994–2000 and 2001–2006, respectively.
POPGR Average rate of population growth over the periods 1994– WDI and IFS
2000 and 2001–2006.
INVESTMENT Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP, averaged  WDI
over the periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2006, respectively.
SIZE Total value of GDP as a percentage of world GDP, averaged  WDI and IFS
over the periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2006, respectively.
SUPERVISION Ofﬁcial supervisory power, which examines whether the  BCL
supervisory authorities possess the power to take corrective 
action when confronted with violations of regulations or other
imprudent behavior on the part of banks. This variable ranges
from 0 to 14, with a higher value indicating greater power.
PRIVATEMONITOR The private monitor index, which tries to capture market or  BCL
private monitoring existing in different countries. The greater 
the number, the more the public has access to information 
about the overall condition of the banking industry. This 
variable ranges from 0 to 9 with a higher value indicating 
more supervision.
(continued)Eschenbach et al. (2000), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Shen and Lee
(2006). For example, CREDIT describes the role of ﬁnancial development
in the growth equation, TRADE controls the eﬀect of trade openness,
STDINFLA reﬂects the uncertainty of inﬂation on the growth, PCGDP90
serves as the initial endowment eﬀect, SECOND90 is schooling levels, and
INSTITUTION is institutional factors (measures of corruption, law and
order, and bureaucratic quality), as well as population growth over the two
periods.
Country size is measured by GDP, and scaled by world GDP. We employ
the share of domestic banking assets held by the three largest banks to
measure the degree of competition in banking.17
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17. The concentration ratio is an outcome-based variable, and, moreover, a misleading in-
dicator of the level of competition in the banking system because a concentrated market for
banking services can still be contestable. A large number of developed countries such as
Canada and many European countries have banking systems characterized by a small num-
ber of banks, but still produce competitive outcomes.
CAPITALREGU The conditions of overall capital stringency and initial capital  BCL
stringency. It captures both the amount of capital and 
veriﬁable sources of capital that a bank is required to possess. 
This variable ranges from 0 to 9 with a higher value indicating 
greater stringency.
GOVEFFECT The conditions of government effectiveness and regulatory  KKZ
quality. Government effectiveness combines responses on the
quality of public service provisions, the quality of the bureau-
cracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of
the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of
the government’s commitment to policies. Regulatory quality
instead focuses more on the policies themselves, including 
measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such 
as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in 
areas such as foreign trade and business development.
EASIA East Asian and Paciﬁc countries = 1, otherwise = 0. WDI
LATIN Latin American and Caribbean countries = 1, otherwise = 0. WDI
SAHARAN Sub-Saharan African countries = 1, otherwise = 0. WDI
Notes: WDI: World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank. IFS: International Financial
Statistics, published by the IMF. BDL: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000). ICRG: International
Country Risk Guide, published by the PRS Group. BCL: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006). KKZ: Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). 
Table 10.7 (continued)
Variable Name Description Source10.5 Empirical Results
Table 10.8reports the estimated results of equation (1) for our four mod-
els by using two-stage least squares (TSLS), where the second stage adopts
weighted least squares (WLS).18 Table 10.9 reports the estimated results of
equation (2). The TSLS procedure is applied to remove the endogenous
eﬀects so as to yield consistent estimates. The WLS is employed to take into
account the heteroskedasticity problem. The weights of the WLS are the
institution and residual squared, but only the former is reported.
In table 10.8, the estimated coeﬃcient of our liberalization variable
COMMITTOBANK in Model (A) is insigniﬁcantly positive, suggesting
that a country which commits to bank opening does not increase the growth
of GDP per capita. The controlled variables emerge with the expected sign,
though not always with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. The most robust variables 
in this regard are PCGDP90 (the initial per capita GDP), which is over-
whelmingly signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that the higher the initial in-
come, the lower the growth. This is consistent with the income convergence
theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). The term INSTITUTION, which 
is the indicator of the general conditions regarding corruption, law and or-
der, and bureaucratic quality, appears to be signiﬁcantly positive in all spec-
iﬁcations, suggesting that good governance enhances economic growth.
Our measures of ﬁnancial sector competition, CONCENTRATION, con-
sistently emerge with a signiﬁcantly negative sign. This should not be sur-
prising because Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) also ﬁnd that the corre-
lation coeﬃcient between the concentration ratio and growth is almost zero.
The term CREDIT is overwhelmingly insigniﬁcant, which is partly similar
to the ﬁndings in Shen and Lee (2006).19
Model (B) does not consider the liberalization and mainly examines the
indirect eﬀect of COMMITTOBANK through the CONCENTRATION.
Thus, the focus is on the coeﬃcient of CONCENTRATION reported in
table 10.8 and the coeﬃcient of COMMITTOBANK in equation (2) re-
ported in table 10.9. The coeﬃcient of CONCENTRATION in table 10.8 is
equal to –0. 0447 and is signiﬁcant, suggesting that the higher the ratio, the
lower the growth. Because the coeﬃcient of COMMITTOBANK in table
10.9 is –15.1629 and is signiﬁcant, we do ﬁnd an indirect eﬀect that the lib-
eralization of the banking industry decreases the concentration ratio,
which then increases the growth.
When the square of COMMITTOALL is added, as shown in Model (C),
the estimated coeﬃcients of COMMITTOALL and  COMMITTOALL2
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18. Our TSLS approach uses all exogenous variables to ﬁrst predict the CONCENTRATION.
The resulting predicted variables secondly replace the actual variables. The WLS simply uses
the variable INSTITUTION as the weight to minimize the eﬀect of the heteroskedasticity.
19. The coeﬃcients of CREDIT in their regression are either insigniﬁcant or negative.Table 10.8 The GDP per capita growth equation: Equation (1) of four models
Independent Variables Model A Model B Model C Model D Model D
CONSTANT 1.6559 1.7604*** 0.4187 –2.8994** –2.0923
(1.589) (1.651) (0.287) (–2.245) (–1.518)






COMMITTOBANK × 0.0535 0.0437
SUPERVISION (0.594) (0.467)
COMMITTOBANK × –0.1337 0.0142
PRIVATE MONITOR (–0.517) (0.057)
COMMITTOBANK × –0.2442** –0.2275**
CAPITALREGU (–2.406) (–2.349)
COMMITTOBANK × 0.5968*** 0.6125***
GOVEFFECT (1.699) (1.820)








CONCENTRATION –0.0458* –0.0447** –0.0514* –0.0116 –0.0087
(–2.605) (–2.459) (–2.755) (–0.778) (–0.598)
CREDIT 0.0014 0.0012 –0.00003 0.0011 0.0007
(1.206) (0.914) (–0.022) (1.056) (0.659)
TRADE 0.0055** 0.0054** 0.0053** –0.0005 –0.0012
(2.096) (1.971) (2.154) (–0.176) (–0.426)
STDINFLA –0.0022 –0.0022 –0.0011 –0.0017 –0.0013
(–1.105) (–1.065) (–0.953) (–1.231) (–0.935)
PCGDP90 –0.0002* –0.0002* –0.0002* –0.0001* –0.0001*
(–5.282) (–4.671) (–4.765) (–3.487) (–3.211)
SECOND90 0.0090 0.0093 0.0176** 0.0011 –0.00001
(1.424) (1.537) (2.105) (0.204) (–0.003)
INSTITUTION 0.3771* 0.3729* 0.4170* 0.5397* 0.4644*
(3.579) (3.508) (3.909) (3.557) (3.124)
POPGR –0.9839* –1.0006* –0.9169* –0.8209*
(–5.476) (–5.624) (–5.312) (–4.866)
INVESTMENT 0.1043* 0.1049*
(2.595) (2.583)
R2 0.349 0.338 0.208 0.472 0.500
Number of observations 138 138 141 130 130
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust t-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The model is estimated by Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS), while
the second stage uses Weighted Least Squares (WLS) with the weight being equal to institution.are –5.3429 and 5.5680, respectively. Thus, the inﬂuence of overall ﬁnan-
cial liberalization that includes the insurance, banking, and other sectors
on the growth of income takes the form of a U-shaped curve; it ﬁrst de-
creases the growth of income and then increases it. As the commitments
start to increase, the burden and costs raised by short-run adjustments
from the industries decrease the growth rate. As more and more liberaliza-
tion measures are introduced, however, competition will bring about long-
run beneﬁts and will raise the growth of income.
The fourth column of table 10.8 reports the estimated results using
Model (D), which incorporates the interaction variables. The estimated
coeﬃcient of the liberalization variable COMMITTOBANK is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, implying that the liberalization of the banking sector can
increase the growth. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient of the interaction vari-
able COMMITTOBANK   GOVEFFECT is signiﬁcantly positive, sug-
gesting that good government eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality can
enhance the liberalization eﬀect. The coeﬃcients of the interaction vari-
ables COMMITTOBANK SUPERVISIONand COMMITTOBANK 
PRIVATEMONITOR are insigniﬁcant. To our surprise, though, the co-
eﬃcients of COMMITTOBANK   CAPITALREGU and COMMITTO-
BANK   INSTITUTION are small, and are signiﬁcantly negative. Ac-
cordingly, the stringency of the requirements of capital regulations and 
a decrease in the corruption may lessen the eﬀect of liberalization. Because
the coeﬃcient of COMMITTOBANKis much larger (8.4426) than those of
the two interaction variables (–0.2442 and –0.7341), the reduced eﬀect is
small, except for large CAPITALREGU and INSTITUTION.20
The last column of table 10.8 reports the estimated results when the re-
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20. This negative eﬀect may be due to the short-run pain and long-run gain as suggested by
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003).
Table 10.9 The bank concentration equation: concentration
Independent Variables Model A Model B Model D
CONSTANT 76.5271* 76.5271* 78.3417*
(17.530) (17.530) (17.898)
COMMITTOBANK –15.1629** –15.1629** –17.4480**
(–2.109) (–2.109) (–2.496)
SIZE –1.5466* –1.5466* –1.5735*
(–7.479) (–7.479) (–7.476)
R2 0.764 0.764 0.779
Number of observations 138 138 130
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust t-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁ-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The model is estimated by Weighted Least
Squares (WLS) with the weight being equal to COMMITTOBANK.gional dummies are included. The coeﬃcients of the COMMITTOBANK
remain signiﬁcantly positive, with the coeﬃcient being equal to 8.1972.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction variables between COMMITTOBANK
and the three regional dummies, EASIA, LATIN and SAHARAN are over-
whelmingly negative (–0.5974, –2.2099, and –2.768, respectively). How-
ever, only the latter two are signiﬁcant. Thus, liberalization indeed in-
creases the growth, but this positive eﬀect is lessened only when it is
implemented in Latin America and the Sub-Saharan area.
Table 10.9 reports the estimated results of equation (2) for models (A),
(B) and (D). The coeﬃcients of COMMITTOBANK are signiﬁcantly neg-
ative regardless of the models, suggesting that the country that commits to
bank opening decreases the concentration ratio of the banking sector. This
may be because once the restrictions and regulations of the banking mar-
ket are lessened, the establishment of new banks becomes more common,
which decreases the concentration ratio.
To sum up, these results with regard to ﬁnancial sector competition and
growth, which are taken together with the apparent link between competi-
tion and liberalization, point to the following pattern in the data. Open ﬁ-
nancial sectors are more competitive, and more competitive ﬁnancial sec-
tors are strongly correlated with higher growth rates. Hence, through
procompetitive eﬀects, trade in ﬁnancial services may enhance growth rates.
10.6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
This chapter constructs a new ﬁnancial liberalization index and then ex-
amines the impact of liberalization on economic growth. Although our
chapter focuses on the liberalization of the trade in services (ﬁnance) sec-
tor, it is interesting to discuss the link between trade in services liberaliza-
tion and trade in the goods sector ﬁrst. Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subra-
manian (2006), for example, conclude that services liberalization diﬀers
from trade in goods because the former involves factor mobility and leads
to scale eﬀects that are distinctive, though not unique. Goods liberalization
in the absence of services liberalization could well result in negative eﬀec-
tive protection of goods, thus highlighting the need for the latter to keep
pace with the former. Deardorﬀ (2001) even stresses that the service liber-
alization can improve the trade liberalization. He examines the role played
by services liberalization and ﬁnds that it can stimulate the trade not only
in services, but also in goods. In particular, international trade in goods re-
quires inputs from trade in services, too. Restrictions on movements in ser-
vices across borders add costs and barriers to international trade in goods.
Liberalizing trade in services could thus facilitate trade in goods.
Our new ﬁnancial liberalization index is constructed based on the WTO
commitment schedules of ninety-three countries in relation to ﬁnancial
services, and covers the 1994–2006 period. In the analysis we introduce
several revisions, based on the method adopted by Hoekman (1995, 1996),
336 Lee-Rong Wang, Chung-Hua Shen, and Ching-Yang Liangto calculate the ﬁnancial liberalization indices. These revisions include the
covering mode 4 and all subsectors listed in the Annex on Financial Ser-
vices, the weighting assigned to each of the four modes, and further scor-
ing for partial commitments.
Our results show that the degree of liberalization is positively correlated
with income level under modes 1, 2, and 3, but not mode 4. The liberaliza-
tion index has a higher degree of correlation with the total trade balance
than with the net trade balance, regardless of the subsectors. The correla-
tion between the liberalization index and both trade balances, respectively,
is raised when only mode 1 and mode 2 are covered in the liberalization in-
dex, probably because the existing statistics for the trade in services from
the IMF only cover the trading volume under mode 1 and mode 2. In ad-
dition, the liberalization in relation to market access and to national treat-
ment is highly correlated. Also, a member country with a high degree of lib-
eralization in one of these two subsectors tends to also have a high degree
of liberalization in the other subsector.
We also ﬁnd that East Asia and the Paciﬁc and Latin America and the
Caribbean are liberalized under mode 3 the most, whereas European and
Central Asian and North American countries have chosen to liberalize less
under mode 3 as compared with mode 1 and mode 2. East Asia and Paciﬁc,
and Latin America and Caribbean regions comprise many developing
countries, which traditionally attract experienced foreign ﬁnancial institu-
tions through foreign direct investment (i.e., mode 3) in order to help de-
velop their own domestic ﬁnancial industries. By liberalizing under mode 3,
which enables countries to attract incoming foreign direct investment, these
countries not only enhance their industrial development and technology
transfer, but they also increase their domestic employment in these areas.
Once the index is constructed, regression analyses are employed to in-
vestigate the direct and indirect eﬀects of the liberalization on growth,
where the indirect eﬀect is examined through the concentration ratio of
banks in each country. Furthermore, we examine whether the direct eﬀect
is aﬀected by the governance variable in a broad sense and based on the re-
gional variables. Our results show that the liberalization of the banking
sector does directly enhance growth when all variables are included; how-
ever, it is only slightly sensitive to the model’s speciﬁcations. The indirect
eﬀect also exists since the liberalization is found to negatively aﬀect con-
centration, which will then negatively aﬀect the growth.
Turning to the case of governance, the results also show that good gov-
ernment eﬀectiveness and regulatory quality can enhance the liberaliza-
tion eﬀect. In addition, the stringency of the requirements of capital regu-
lations and a decrease in corruption may lessen the eﬀect of liberalization,
although the eﬀect is small. With respect to the regional eﬀect, liberaliza-
tion indeed increases the growth in East Asia, but this positive eﬀect is less-
ened only when it is implemented in Latin America and the Sub-Saharan
area.
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Table 10A.1 The GDP per capita growth equation: Equation (1) of four models
Model A Model B Model C  Model D Model D
Independent Variables (TSLS) (TSLS) (TSLS) (TSLS) (TSLS)
CONSTANT 1.8685*** 1.8699*** 0.7873 –2.4521*** –1.6581
(1.739) (1.780) (0.578) (–1.674) (–1.075)






COMMITTOBANK × 0.0266 0.0178
SUPERVISION (0.297) (0.192)
COMMITTOBANK × –0.0614 0.0704
PRIVATEMONITOR (–0.251) (0.293)
COMMITTOBANK × –0.2485* –0.2458*
CAPITALREGU (–2.580) (–2.580)
COMMITTOBANK × 0.5088 0.4923
GOVEFFECT (1.442) (1.434)








CONCENTRATION –0.0356** –0.0356** –0.0389* –0.0124 –0.0108
(–2.548) (–2.484) (–2.697) (–0.854) (–0.766)
CREDIT 0.0009 0.0009 –0.0006 0.0011 0.0008
(0.775) (0.741) (–0.399) (1.021) (0.658)
TRADE 0.0054** 0.0054** 0.0047*** 0.0006 0.0001
(2.068) (2.020) (1.955) (0.218) (0.019)
STDINFLA –0.0024 –0.0024 –0.0014 –0.0017 –0.0015
(–1.120) (–1.079) (–1.093) (–1.190) (–0.949)
PCGDP90 –0.0002* –0.0002* –0.0002* –0.0001* –0.0001*
(–5.307) (–4.870) (–4.997) (–3.356) (–3.068)
SECOND90 0.0060 0.0060 0.0131*** 0.0002 –0.0010
(1.028) (1.073) (1.763) (0.042) (–0.209)
INSTITUTION 0.3372* 0.3372* 0.3641* 0.4761* 0.4087**
(3.647) (3.692) (3.935) (2.891) (2.564)
POPGR –0.8936* –0.8938* –0.8556* –0.7660*
(–5.090) (–5.291) (–5.061) (–4.555)
INVESTMENT 0.1109* 0.1147*
(2.803) (2.811)
R2 0.301 0.298 0.174 0.424 0.447
Number of observations 138 138 141 130 130
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust t-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The model is estimated by Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS).References
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Comment Shin-ichi Fukuda
The motivation of this chapter is to explore the relationship between liber-
alization of ﬁnancial services and economic growth by cross-country re-
gression. There are several previous studies that have explored the same is-
sue. But how to measure the depth and growth of ﬁnancial markets is very
controversial in these studies. There are some measures of the depth and
growth of ﬁnancial markets in literature: liquid liabilities and gross claims
on the private sector in King and Levine (1993), private sector credit in De
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), real interest rate distortions and lending-
deposit spread in Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and stock market ac-
tivities in Levine and Zervos (1998). Problems with these measures are that
they are endogenous variables. Causality was not necessarily clear in these
studies. Some common factor may derive both ﬁnancial development and
growth. Financial development—typically measured by the level of credit
and the size of the stock market—may predict economic growth simply be-
cause ﬁnancial markets anticipate future growth.
What is new in this chapter is the use of measures on liberalization on in-
ternational trade in ﬁnancial services based on the GATS commitments in
overall ﬁnancial sectors. The measures may not be purely exogenous, but
less endogenous than those in previous studies. By using the measures, the
authors constructed an index to measure nontariﬀ barriers and found a
more clear and less biased link from ﬁnancial liberalization to economic
growth. The main result is a positive link between the liberalization of the
ﬁnancial sector and economic growth. But the link is indirect. The liberal-
ization of the ﬁnancial sector leads to more competition within the ﬁnan-
cial sector and this leads to higher economic growth. An implication of this
chapter is that the liberalization of the ﬁnancial sector is important because
it makes the ﬁnancial sector more competitive. The result seems plausible.
However, there are alternative views in the literature for the impacts of
ﬁnancial market liberalization: a positive view, a negative view, and a pos-
itive view with some reservations. A positive view, which is this chapter’s
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(1993). They assert that ﬁnancial market liberalization will channel invest-
ment funds to their most productive uses so that it will enhance capital ac-
cumulation and promote economic growth. In contrast, a negative view,
such as Stiglitz (2004), insists that the positive views are based on the neo-
classical model with perfect information, perfect capital market, and per-
fect competition. Capital-market liberalization was systematically associ-
ated with instability in developing countries. Crises in East Asia and Latin
America in recent decades are good examples for the instability. A positive
view with some reservations asserts that the liberalization of foreign direct
investment (FDI) has a positive eﬀect on economic growth. But the liber-
alization of short-term capital ﬂows does not. The economic crises of the
late 1990s were attributable to worldwide capital-market liberalization of
short-term capital ﬂows in the 1980s and 1990s. Another positive view with
some reservations proposes that we need some preconditions for successful
capital-market liberalization, such as good corporate governance, trans-
parent accounting rules, legal protections of investors, prudential regu-
lation by government, some possible extensions, and so on. This chapter
attempts to identify some of the channels through which capital-market
liberalization leads to faster economic growth, but it does not seem to at-
tempt to test the alternative hypothesis, including the positive views with
some reservations. We need to include alternative measures in the regres-
sions to test the alternative hypothesis. The use of some measures on capi-
tal-market liberalization of short-term capital ﬂows may be desirable.
To check the robustness of the interesting ﬁndings, we call for further in-
vestigations in the chapter. In the growth regression, the index of ﬁnancial
liberalization becomes insigniﬁcant when concentration in the ﬁnancial
sector is included in the explanatory variables. The liberalization of the ﬁ-
nancial sector may not enhance economic growth unless it makes the ﬁ-
nancial sector more competitive. This is somewhat consistent with the pos-
itive view with some reservations. Model (C) ﬁnds that there is a nonlinear
relationship between the index of ﬁnancial liberalization and economic
growth. The overall ﬁnancial liberalization ﬁrst has a negative impact on
economic growth, and then the impact becomes positive. This ﬁnding may
also be consistent with the alternative views. We probably need to add
further deliberate interpretations, as well as further regressions, to the ro-
bustness.
The sample periods may be too short to discuss long-run economic
growth. The chapter used the average growth rate for the periods 1994–2000
and 2001–2005. The average growth rate in the short sample periods may
reﬂect short-run business cycles. In particular, a series of crises occurred
during the sample periods. Ideally, we need longer sample periods.
We may also need to use alternative economic indicators in the regres-
sions. Economic indicators that are included in standard growth regres-
342 Lee-Rong Wang, Chung-Hua Shen, and Ching-Yang Liangsions are initial income level, investment rates (or saving rates), population
growth, and human capital. These variables are consistent with Solow’s
growth model (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). The chapter included
most of them. But investment rates (or saving rates) are missing in this
chapter. Investment rates are usually the most signiﬁcant variable. In this
chapter, the level of human capital is controlled by the secondary school
enrollment ratio. But this is a ﬂow data. Theoretically, it is more desirable
to use some stock data of human capital such as accumulation of previous
school enrollments (see Barro and Lee 1993).
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Comment Roberto S. Mariano
This chapter utilizes panel cross-country regressions, of the partial
reduced-form type, to analyze the overall contribution of the ﬁnancial sec-
tor to economic growth and the role of liberalization in the ﬁnancial sector
(as well as the competition within the sector) in this process. One main con-
tribution of the chapter lies in the way in which ﬁnancial liberalization is
measured—namely, through the ﬁnancial liberalization commitments of
countries under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
The ﬁnancial sector liberalization index in the chapter is based on esti-
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Emeritus of Economics and Statistics at the University of Pennsylvania.mates of tariﬀ-equivalents for trade in ﬁnancial services utilizing GATS
commitments within the WTO—as submitted by each member country
within the periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2005. Two liberalization indices
are constructed: one for all ﬁnancial services (banking, insurance, and oth-
ers) and one for banking alone. These indices are constructed through a
disaggregate treatment of subsectors of ﬁnancial services and the four pos-
sible modes of supply identiﬁed by GATS, with appropriate weighting of
the four modes and with scoring for partial commitments, and in the con-
text of market access and national treatment. The four modes of supply
identiﬁed by GATS are cross-border supply, consumption abroad, com-
mercial presence, and movement of natural persons.
Patterns of correlation of these liberalization indices with the trade bal-
ance for WTO members, and diﬀerences among these indices across geo-
graphical regions as well as income levels are described in the chapter. The
empirical analysis in the chapter points to a “positive pattern linking the
ﬁnancial sector competition indicators with . . . ﬁnancial sector liberaliza-
tion, and economic growth with the ﬁnancial sector competition.” The
positive eﬀect is increased further when a government is eﬀective and has
good regulation. However, when a country has stringent requirements on
capital regulation and decreased corruption, the positive eﬀects of an open
banking sector are lessened.
The authors go through a painstaking process of constructing their in-
dices and they are to be commended for the detailed work and discussion
of this process as well as their literature review and discussion of patterns
of ﬁnancial liberalization under the WTO. These are covered in the ﬁrst
three sections of the chapter. In their discussion, the authors allude to one
possible major deﬁciency of their liberalization index—that is, being based
on GATS commitments rather than on extent of liberalization that actu-
ally took place. It could very well be that these commitments are the best
observable proxy for actual liberalization. But, the authors themselves
point out that “subsequent unilateral liberalization undertaken by some
members has widened the gap between GATS commitments and actual
measures.”
The fourth and ﬁfth sections of the chapter deal with the empirics of ﬁ-
nancial liberalization and growth. In footnote 19, the authors comment
that the variable CONCENTRATION is a misleading indicator of the level
of competition in the banking system. If this is the case, why use this vari-
able in the empirical exercise at all? The estimation results reported in
tables 10.8 and 10.9 apparently are based on panel data for ninety-three
countries for the two periods 1994–2000 and 2001–2005. I wonder how this
number of ninety-three countries ﬁts with the reported numbers of obser-
vations in tables 10.8 and 10.9 (between 130 and 141). It is good to see that
the authors have included Model (D) in tables 10.8 and 10.9, which shows
statistically signiﬁcant interaction terms—such as the interaction of ﬁnan-
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(CAPITALREGU), government eﬀectiveness (GOVEFFECT), and corrup-
tion (INSTITUTION). Regarding estimating procedure, as remarked by
the authors in footnote 20, the estimated equations in table 10.8 are ob-
tained by a two-stage least squares procedure which uses all the exogenous
variables to correct for the endogeneity of CONCENTRATION. In the sec-
ond stage, weighted least squares is implemented by using INSTITUTION
as the weight in the correction for heteroskedasticity. The authors need 
to re-examine this approach on various counts. Concerning the correction
for heteroskedasticity, if INSTITUTION is categorical, (and this is not
clear in the chapter), why not use estimated standard deviations in each 
INSTITUTION category as the weights?
As to the correction for endogeneity, some of the other regressors in the
equation for growth in per capita GDP in Model (D) also may be endoge-
nous, such as trade openness (TRADE), percent of credit to the private
sector (CREDIT), standard deviation of inﬂation (STDINFLA), and ﬁ-
nancial liberalization itself (COMMITTOBANK). If so, these variables
cannot be used as instruments in the ﬁrst stage and, indeed, corrections for
their endogeneity also should be made.
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